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ADRIAN M. VIENS 
T
he prospect for objectivity and determinate truth-values 
in the realm of moral inquiry has certainly gained 
greater sympathy in recent years. Traditional arguments 
from logical positivists, which maintained that value 
judgements, as opposed to factual judgements, were devoid of 
meaning or, at best, some lower order of non-cognitive meaning 
have been abandoned (Misak, 1994, 39). Even with the rejection 
of the legitimacy of such views, there is still a tendency to 
differentiate mathematical or logical propositions from those of 
the moral or political realm based on their formalism. While 
opening the door to the possibility of a cognitivist account of 
ethics, this has resulted in a state of affairs whereby moral claims 
or beliefs are at worst not considered sufficient to be considered 
candidates for objective truth-values, or; at best, admits a two­
tiered truth pluralism wherein empirical propositions are consid­
ered more true than moral propositions. 
Those anticipating my argument may be expecting a re­
hashing of some form of realism in which the possibility of 
objective truth-values can be realized. However, the prospect of 
achieving genuine moral beliefs is not to be found in the believer­
independent metaphysics of some correspondence-based realism 
advanced by philosophers such as Michael Dummett who, while 
maintaining the possibility of objective truth-values, render the 
truth or falsity of such propositions independent of the inquirer's 
understanding. Instead, what is needed is a competing epistemic 
account that holds a view that the truth of a particular belief or 
proposition does not go beyond experience and inquiry. I con­
tend that this account ista be found in pragmatism. The prag­
matic epistemology originated by C. S. Peirce (1839-1913), and 
subsequently developed by contemporary pragmatists such as 
Cheryl Misak and Christopher Hookway in tl1eir recent works 
Truth, Politics, and MoraUft}: Pragmatism and Deliberation and 
Truth, Rationalift} and Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce provides an 
elucidation and improvement of Peirce's account of truth and an 
ideal normative framework in which a persuasive case can be 
made for the possibility of objective moral knowledge. 
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The focus of this paper will be to demonstrate that the 
success of the pragmatic view lies in its ability to illustrate that 
both empirical and moral propositions have determinate content 
that, when asserted, leads to consequences and commitments; 
when unpacked, these commitments show that genuine beliefs, 
including moral beliefs, aim at truth and thus strive for objectiv­
ity. Moreover, I will argue that such an account will provide not 
only a robust account of truth that admits moral propositions as 
candidates for determinate truth-values, but also sufficiently 
defends against the spectre of moral relativism without resorting 
to cultural imperialism. Although such an account in moral 
philosophy - one that places truth at its core - appears different 
from much of the contemporary discourse, it just may be what is 
needed to firmly establish the attainment of genuine moral 
knowledge. 
I. Genuine Beliefs and the Commitments of Inquiry 
In "The Fixation of Belief," Peirce argues that a true belief is one 
that is fated to be agreed upon were we to inquire as far as we 
could. Cheryl Misak improves this notion of truth to read that a 
U true belief is one upon which inquiry could not improve -: a 
belief which would fit with experience and argument and which 
would satisfy the aims of inquiry, no matter how much the issue 
was subject to experiment, evaluation, and debate" (2000, 1). The 
pragmatist rejects the correspondence theory of truth on the basis 
that it disconnects truth from the practice of inquiry (i.e., a 
proposition's veracity is not dependent on what evidence can 
speak for or against it). From an epistemic perspective, this 
pragmatic construct throws a lifeline to truth and objectivity and 
rescues it from the mind-independent metaphysics that has fallen 
into derision. Instead, we put in its place a process of inquiry in 
which we strive to obtain the best belief - with "best" denoting a 
belief that would fit with available evidence, argumentation, and 
knowledge. On this view, we maintain an account of truth .that 
does not go beyond experience. Although Peirce did not devote 
an inordinate amount of time to discussing moral philosophy, his 
work in epistemology does set a solid foundation for the possibil­
ity of genuine moral knowledge. 
Christopher Hookway reinforces the importance of the 
internal connection between assertion and truth in the pragmatic 
account of truth when he states that "every assertion that we 
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make involves a commitment to the truth of the asserted proposi­
tion" (62). Thus, our commitment to a proposition's truth is 
manifested in our practice that to assert proposition "p" is analo­
gous to asserting: TIp is true." However, we will see that we will 
want to distinguish this view from that of the minimalist or 
disquotationalist views, for under Peirce's assertoric account, we 
obtain a more robust account of truth (and this will have impor­
tant implications for moral inquiry, as we shall see).l A view of 
truth expressed by the minimalist does not go far enough in 
linking truth and inquiry, for the disquotationalist schema does 
not express the commitments that we incur in discourse, and as a 
result is not sufficient to account for the expectations and features 
of a true belief that is necessary for inquiry (Misak, 2000, 59). 
According to Hookway, Peirce's account of truth is best 
understood not as a method of explaining the meaning of a 
proposition's truth, but rather as an account of the commitments 
we incur when we assert a proposition. When we assert a 
proposition, it is done under the belief that it is the best belief 
according to the available evidence and argumentation, and it 
would stand up to future inquiry. However, we are also commit­
ted to the view that under subsequent experience, our beliefs 
may be thrown into doubt, which may necessitate modification 
or abandonment for a new belief. 
Yet Hookway adds an important qualification in this 
pragmatic account of truth - he argues that Peirce holds that 
when we assert a proposition "the content of what I commit 
myself to can be somewhat indeterminate" (57). The case in 
which truth is indeterminate, yet reality is determinate will 
" .. . involve quite a complex propositional attitude, one that uses 
the concept of truth to articulate an ideal to which the asserted 
proposition does not fully measure up. In that case, asserting a 
proposition commits me to its 'approximate truth/ not exactly its 
truth" (64-5). Such commitments are tied into Peirce's fallibilismi 
since we can never really know when we have reached the best 
belief, we need to focus on the process and aims of inquiry itself. 
History reveals that previous beliefs (both empirical and moral), 
which we thought were absolute or could not be improved upon, 
were subsequently revised or invalidated on further evidence or 
argumentation. Inquiry is an active process in which new evi­
dence and justifications continually test our beliefs, and if doubt 
is cast on a particular belief, the opportunity is provided under 
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the pragmatic account that allows for subsequent refinement or 
replacement of that belief. 
II. Dissolution of the FactjVdue Dichotomy 
Recall that under Misak's improvement of Peirce's account of 
truth, a true belief is one that best fits with evidence and argu­
mentation, and we would expect it to stand up to recalcitrant 
experience. Yet it will be necessary to briefly elaborate on the 
process of good inquiry and how we arrive at these best beliefs, 
for on Hookway's account, "if we cannot do this, then Peirce's 
clams about truth become trivial and uninteresting - an inquiry 
counts as good enough only when it contributes to producing 
agreement, even if we cannot say in detail what was good about 
the inquirer's activities" (51). In both empirical and moral areas 
of discourse, we tend to adopt a method of inquiry which results 
in agreement and convergence - what Peirce called the /Iscientific 
method." What is important on Peirce's construal of such a 
method is that it takes experience seriously, and has a very broad 
account that what experience consists in. 
Unlike the classical empiricists or logical positivists who 
took a thin and constrained view of experience to include only 
perceptual evidence from the sensory world that could speak for 
or against the veracity of a particular belief, on Peirce's account, 
experience is much more broadly construed as that which im­
pinges on us - all "compulsions of thought" (Vol. 8, paragraph 
101). Experience is more than what can be seen, heard, and felt in 
the physical world, but anything that is "to be classed under the 
species of perception wherein a positive qualitative content is 
forced upon one's acknowledgement without reason or preten­
sion to reason" (Vol. 7, paragraph 623). The central role of experi­
ence, especially such a broad construal; under the Peircian notion 
of pragmatism is imperative because it appears to leave room for 
all propositions and beliefs (especially those concerned with 
morality) to qualify as genuine and objective. 
However, if the pragmatist is to succeed in the establish­
ment of genuine moral knowledge, it will be necessary to dis­
solve the fact/value dichotomy. It will not be necessary to show 
that beliefs and propositions from empirical discourse are analo­
gous to those in moral discourse, but only to show that both 
maintain similar aims and commitments. Misak advocates the 
need to adopt a radical holism that does not result in "driving a 
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wedge between various sorts of inquiri' and instead focus on the 
features and commitments of areas of genuine inquiry in which 
determinate truth-values are to be found to see if moral proposi­
tions can measure up (2000, 84). 
On the view of classical empiricists and logical positivists, 
all genuine beliefs originated and were verified by perceptual 
experience of the physical world. Yet it was well-recognized that 
particular areas of scientific inquiry such as mathematics and 
logic, while thought to be objective and candidates for truth­
values, could not meet the test of experience. Hence, we were left 
with the analytic/ synthetic distinction, which while acknowl­
edging the inability of perceptual experience to verify mathemat­
ical or logical beliefs, allowed for a dualism in which these 
propositions were accorded a greater level of legitimacy in our 
inquiries. However, even with the admittance of the Quine/ 
Duhem Thesis, which rejects the distinction between the analytic 
and synthetic on the grounds that synthetic statements fail the 
empiricist test, mathematical and logical propositions were still 
accorded a legitimacy in our inquiries, which, while not indepen­
dently verifiable, were taken to be objective and candidates for 
truthvalues (85). 
On Misak's account, since the view that Quine was pro­
moting jettisons the tTaditional empiricist dichotomy, there is 
nothing substantive that can be proffered from the exclusion of 
moral judgements from the realm of genuine belief. If both 
empirical and moral areas of inquiry are aiming at achieving the 
best beliefs - beliefs that fit with theoretical and observational 
experience - "there is no prima facie reason for denying moral 
inquiry a place in our search for truth" (86). If we take the process 
of inquiry seriously, that is, take it to have the aim of discovering 
genuine beliefs with determinate truth-values, there is no reason 
to suppose that given the dissolution of the fact/value dichotomy 
and the broad Peircian view of experience, we are not strongly 
warranted in treating moral inquiry as a genuine and objective 
area of inquiry. 
The view of radical holism that Misak advances is attrac­
tive for it maintains an account of knowledge that requires 
genuine beliefs to be accountable to experience - to the reasons 
and evidence that strive to throw it into doubt. It is a view that, 
by making experience the "new empirical test," strikes a difficult 
balance between not prejudicing particular areas on inquiry 
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based on artificial distinctions and maintaining a robust account 
that does not require the devaluing of empirical propositions to 
meet the needs of moral propositions. However, the pragmatist 
does not want to advance a position that maintains that state­
ments from areas of inquiry such as physics and morality are 
analogous in every way. What the pragmatist has done is to 
show that if we take a view of inquiry to be the achievement of 
true beliefs that are resistant to recalcitrant evidence, we should 
be able to see why moral beliefs can aspire to truth and objectiv­
ity and can be good candidates for determinate truth-values. As 
Ivfisak succinctly points out, once we can see that under Peirce's 
account the line between fact and value is blurred, in that both 
classes of belief (e.g. empirical and moral) are both constrained 
by experience, we are warranted in expecting that inquiry into 
these matters will result in determinate answers (1994,44). Both 
empirical and moral beliefs are acquired through the same per­
ceptual set and both are vulnerable to doubt and reclassification 
by recalcitrant experience. 
III. Moral Inquiry, Pluralism, and Relativism 
"Moral deliberation has many marks of objectivity - the distinc­
tion between thinking that one (or one's culture) is right and 
being right, the use of moral beliefs in inferences, the thought 
that we can discover that something is right or wrong and 
improve our views, and the thought that it is appropriate, or even 
required, that we give reasons and arguments for our beliefs, to 
name a few" (Misak, 2000, 52). The objectivity of moral proposi­
tions lies in their sensitivity to recalcitrant evidence and argu­
mentation. If we were really a bunch of subjectivists who believe 
that appeal to objective moral values were specious, why do we 
deliberate and dispute so much about morality? I am inclined to 
believe that we take moral inquiry seriously because we believe 
that there is something to get correct - there is a right and a 
wrong answer. We hope that there will be an upshot to our 
activities, namely determinate answers with true-values. 
The qualifications of our beliefs, which tend to be more 
predominant in moral inquiry, show that as an area of discourse, 
it is not as clean and ordered as mathematics. However, the 
desire to abandon our project of moral knowledge on the basis of 
these qualifications is misguided. In actuality, no area of dis­
course is free from the need for qualification. If it is a legitimate 
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area of inquiry, inquirers will be continually striving for obtain­
ing the best belief. Even if it is conceded that qualification in 
areas of discourse such as morality and politics is more prevalent 
than in the natural and physical sciences, the same fact remains ­
both empirical and moral areas of inquiry aim at getting the best 
belief supported by available evidence and argumentation, and 
as a result are vulnerable to qualification. Quite paradoxically, 
the qualification of moral beliefs is seen as a weakness; however, 
the phenomenology of moral inquiry should establish that IIour 
practice of justifying moral belief speaks against the non­
cognitivist. It speaks against those who do not think there is 
good reason to see moral belief as being objective - those who 
think that the best explanation of a person's moral judgements is 
always a story about the person's cultural background or up­
bringing" (52). 
Yet we still run into difficulties. For showing that the 
project of genuine moral knowledge is cognitive may be neces­
sary, but it is not sufficient-even J. L. Mackie agrees that moral 
claims pass any reasonable test for cognitive contenti however, 
such a state of affairs does not necessitate the jump to viewing 
moral claims as objective. Such objections are not novel; philoso­
phers such as David Burne and G. E. Moore have raised similar 
claims in the past. In the desire to show that moral knowledge 
can be objective, the pragmatist is not interested in making the 
case for some absolutist notion such as a categorical imperative 
or some form of act utilitarianism. 
The pragmatist admits in certain areas of moral inquiry 
there will be underdetermination, and as a result there will be 
instances of conflict between moral principles or morally permis­
sible actions where it appears that there will be no upshot to our 
inquiry. Does this indicate the absence of authenticity of objec­
tive moral judgements (and the project)? I do not believe the 
evidence bears out such a conclusion. Although this does neces­
sitate caution, it does not indicate systematic relativism or doubt 
about the validity of moral judgements as truth-value candidates, 
for no belief is immune from revision or doubt. Although tll.ere is 
a higher frequency in moral inquiry as opposed to mathematical 
inquiry, both areas of inquiry aim at achieving the best belief - a 
belief that fits with available evidence, argumentation, and 
knowledge. 
The strength of the pragmatist project lies inits ability to 
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(in the midst of divergent opinions and values) provide a robust 
account of ethics that can objectively criticize particular beliefs or 
actions as amoral, without resorting to cultural imperialism. 
Misak provides a persuasive argument for why such a state of 
affairs of substantive homogeneity in morality is not problematic: 
But the fact that the compulsion of internal experience is 
less pervasive and less persuasive and less insistent 
means that the apparent lack of consensus on moral 
matters does not pose a serious problem for the Peircian 
project. There is a remarkable amount of consensus 
with respect to moral judgements and this can be ex­
plained by the force of internal experience. Any lack of 
consensus can be explained away by the fact that the 
way things are in the moral world does not impinge 
upon us in quite the same way things are in the empiri­
cal world. Thus, there is nothing debilitating about 
some (or many) undetermined moral questions. (1994, 
45) 
The pragmatist will not want to assert that resolution of ethical 
dilemmas will be as clear-cut and uncontroversial as solving a 
mathematical problem - they are clearly two different areas of 
discourse. Yet this lower level of consensus and agreement on 
moral matters does not necessitate that we give up on the project 
of truth and objectivity in morality. It is this challenge - what 
John Rawls calls the "fact of pluralism" which the pragmatist 
must face if the prospect for moral knowledge will be successful. 
We can accommodate the reality of pluralism in Western 
society under Peirce's cognitivist account without succumbing to 
moral relativism. The pragmatist provides the only persuasive 
account which counters the relativist charge that an absence of 
agreement or performance of moral customs or actions is suffi­
cient to establish that there is no trace of objectivity in moral 
inquiry.2 But the pragmatist will be the first to admit that moral­
ity is a special area of inquiry that does not easily admit to 
universalization. "We cannot be quite sure that the community 
ever will settle down to an unalterable conclusion upon any 
given question. Even if they do so for the most part, we have no 
reason to think the unanimity will be quite complete, nor can we 
rationally presume any overwhelming consensus of opinion will 
be reached upon every question" (peirce, 1935, paragraph 610). 
Moreover, the pragmatist will need to be careful when 
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placing truth at the center of his or her ethical account; that one 
particular conception of the good is not endorsed as the good, and 
the rest designated as false or amoral. The pragmatist acknowl­
edges that human lives are better governed internally, and she 
will not want to dictatorially pick one particular conception of 
the good life and force it upon everybody. Instead, pragmatism 
works well with our democratic liberal practices in which it is 
recognized that our lives are better governed internally and that 
individuals can subscribe to numerous acceptable conceptions of 
the good (Misak, 1994,48). While in a pluralistic SOciety, we will 
find many well-formed and permissible conceptions of the good 
life that all have one thing in common. Each comprehensive 
doctrine is promoting a conception of the good which results in 
the production of moral judgements with an associative truth­
value that we hope will not be overturned by subsequent evidence 
and argumentation. 
But a pressing problem remains - although we can main­
tain that moral beliefs strive towards truth and objectivity, how 
does the pragmatist avoid what Paul Taylor called the ethnocen­
tric fallacy (563-4)? How do we avoid designating non-liberal 
values as false (because they do not accord with our own)? It 
almost becomes an exercise of determining not whether the 
moral judgements are true, but whether they accord with West­
ern values! The pragmatist will want to be wary of such a state of 
affairs because she will want to maintain Peirce's account of the 
"community of inquiries." Unlike some contemporary pragma­
tists of Richard Rorty's sb'ipe, who argue for the existence of 
various communities of inquirers (which inevitably lead to rela­
tivism), we are better served with Peirce's conception whereby 
there is only one community of inquirers - all inquirers bound by 
the requirement to justify their beliefs and actions to the entire 
community of inquirers, and not particular segments of it. If we 
are to escape from charges of relativism in the realm of moral 
inqUiry, it will be essential to hold all inquirers accountable to the 
commitments of truth and objectivity, and not allow particular 
beliefs or actions that are resistant to recalcitrant experience. 
It provides the only substantive argument against sub­
stantive homogeneity or the jack-booted thugs who come to take 
you away in the night that is epistemically robust. We can say 
that such conceptions are certainly not in the interest of converg­
ing on the best conception of the good life, but simply and 
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advantageously can identify a conjunction of permissible concep­
tions of the good life that fit with available evidence and argu­
mentation. For instance, while Catholicism or vegetarianism 
would be considered acceptable conceptions of the good life, 
anarchism and Nazism would not be, and could be soundly 
criticized, for views of discrimination and violence do not aim at 
beliefs that fit with available argumentation, reasons, and evi­
dence. "Thus there is room for underdetermination and plural­
ism in a Peircian view of the objective status of moral judge­
ments. Our moral inquiries are legitimized without positing a 
correspondence between our moral judgements and moral facts, 
and without cultural imperialism. For an account of the truth of 
moral judgements that initially looked so implausible, this, I 
suggest, is no small thing" (Misak, 1994, 48). 
Conclusion 
Knowing that all empirical and moral propositions and beliefs 
are vulnerable to recalcitrant evidence or argumentation, the 
pragmatic epistemology of Peirce's stripe is the only account that 
can maintain philosophically robust and identify serious areas of 
inquiry that strive for truth and objectivity. 
The pragmatist does not want to suggest that propositions 
such as "The contemplative life is the good life" and "2 + 2 =4" 
should be seen as analogous entities entitled to identical levels of 
certainty and reasonableness. To think otherwise would miscon­
strue the aspiration of what the pragmatic elucidation can bring 
in the area of genuine moral knowledge. What should be taken 
away from such an account is that in genuine areas of discourse, 
the process of inquiry will be aiming for truth. 
In the area of moral inquiry, for instance, when dealing 
with the question of the good life, the strength of the pragmatic 
cognitivist position is not that it promises to identify the one, true 
conception of the good - instead, the pragmatic epistemology can 
identify various well-formed and rational conceptions of the 
good life, while being able to mount a robust challenge to amoral 
or illogical conceptions such as those advanced by the Nazis. It 
can provide a substantive objection and criticism of amoral be­
liefs or actions, while forcing relativists and sceptics to hide in the 
comer. One cannot make the case, as the relativist or sceptic 
does, that morality is simply a matter of expressing one's subjec­
tive preferences and dislikes, and then turn around and tell a 
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group like the Nazis that genocide is wrong - it is only an 
account which places truth and objectivity at the center of moral 
inquiry that will allow us to levy justified criticism. Pragmatism 
provides such an account. 
University ofToronto 
NOTES 
I The minimalist or disquotationalist view simply states that a proposi­
tion is true if and only if the state of affairs it represents is true [''p'' is 
true if and only ifp]. An instance of this account of truth would be: 
"grass is green" is true if and only if grass is green. Thus, the truth of 
the proposition "grass is green" is only true ifin fact grass is actually 
green. 
2 Relativists will often charge that it is the de Jacto absence of uniform 
adherence to moral beliefs and actions between different communities 
or nations that proves that morality is not objective. It is often charged 
that empirical disciplines, such as science, are the same in the world no 
matter where you go - there is not such thing, for instance, as Chinese 
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